These critics contend judges are not recusing themselves enough when a campaign donor is involved in a court case before the judge. They further argue that even if a judge remains impartial, elections create an appearance of impropriety that damages the public's perception of the judiciary.
Critics suggest that though States may be unable to fully eliminate politics from the judicial section process, appointment methods see less bias and are better able to mitigate political influences. The municipal courts providing information to the OCA reported almost 8 million new cases filed in fiscal year , with about 6. This section of the paper reviews court administration, judicial pay, and court funding to provide a basis for comparison to other states, which are reviewed on Pages The basic administrative structure of the Texas judicial system has three tiers.
In the middle are nine regional administrative judges. At the bottom are administrative judges in each county. Absent the death or incapacity of a regional administrative judge, the Supreme Court does not have the power to assign or reassign cases or trial judges to ensure efficient disposition of cases.
The Court has the power to promulgate rules imposing time standards for disposition of cases and has done so, but it has no ability to enforce those standards. The regional administrative judges are appointed by the Governor for fixed terms and the local administrative judges are elected by their peers for fixed terms, so the Court has little ability to compel those judges to take action for the efficient administration of justice. The courts of appeals have no administrative authority outside their own courts.
The real administrative power in Texas lies with the regional and local administrative judges, who have the power to assign and reassign trial judges and to transfer cases among the trial courts to ensure the efficient administration of justice.
The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court has more administrative authority in regard to the work of the courts of appeals. The Chief Justice, at any time, may temporarily assign a justice of a court of appeals to another court of appeals and may assign a qualified retired appellate justice or judge to a court of appeals.
And the Court may order cases transferred from one court of appeals to another at any time, if in the opinion of the Supreme Court, there is good cause for the transfer.
In regard to funding its judicial system, Texas relies heavily on locally-generated revenue rather than state-generated revenue. Judicial salaries, judicial retirement, and personnel, facilities, and other costs are shared by state, county and city governments. Some revenues generated by the courts are kept at the local level, while other revenues are passed through to the state government.
The result is a system that is unequally funded and that creates accountability, if any, at the local level rather than at a system-wide level. Only the Supreme Court can issue a license to practice law in Texas. The Court has administrative control over the State Bar of Texas. The Court also is required to promulgate rules to provide due process for judges against whom a formal disciplinary proceeding regarding retirement or removal from office has been commenced by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.
These rules, among other things, set time standards for disposition of cases, govern public access to judicial records, and provide procedures for multi-district litigation. The Chief Justice must call and preside over an annual meeting of the presiding judges of the administrative judicial regions, and he may call meetings of the regional presiding judges or local administrative judges that he considers necessary for the promotion of the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
Finally, the Court, on its own initiative, appoints committees and task forces as are necessary to aid the Court in its administrative duties. The Court of Criminal Appeals also has administrative responsibilities. Its primary administrative responsibility is supervising the training of the judiciary and court personnel.
Since , the Court of Criminal Appeals has had rulemaking authority for appellate procedure in criminal cases. Regional Administration.
The State is divided into nine administrative judicial regions, as shown in Map 3. A presiding judge is appointed by the Governor to each Administrative Judicial Region.
As part of the authority to assign judges, the regional presiding judges are called upon to assign judges to hear recusal motions. The presiding judge of an administrative region can request the presiding judge of another administrative region to furnish judges to aid in the disposition of litigation pending in a county in the administrative region of the judge who makes the request.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may make assignments within an administrative region and perform the other duties of a presiding judge if a presiding judge dies or resigns, if an absence, illness, or other incapacity prevents the presiding judge from performing his or her duties for a period of time, or if the presiding judge disqualifies himself or herself in a particular matter.
Local Administration. In addition to regional administration, Texas has a system for the local administration of its district courts, statutory county courts, and statutory probate courts.
Each county has a local administrative district judge and, in counties having a statutory county court, a local administrative statutory county court judge. Judges have an obligation to try any case and hear any proceeding as assigned by the local administrative judge, and the court clerk has an obligation to file, docket, transfer, and assign cases as directed by the local administrative judge in accordance with local rules. Local administration is aided by the ability of judges to sit for one another and move cases among themselves.
Similarly, a statutory county court judge may hear and determine a matter pending in any statutory county court in the county. A judge who has jurisdiction over a suit pending in one county may, unless objected to by any party, conduct any of the judicial proceedings except the trial on the merits in a different county. Statutory probate courts have a statewide, rather than local, administrative structure.
Texas Judicial Council. The twenty-two member Texas Judicial Council was established in to study and report on the organization and practices of the Texas judicial system. Office of Court Administration. The compensation of constitutional county court judges, justices of the peace, and municipal court judges is set and paid by the counties or cities in which those judges sit and, thus, is not uniform.
Judicial System Revenues. Among others, the courts collect the following fees and costs:. In sum, almost all fees collected by the courts are deposited into the judicial fund by the Comptroller. Additionally, local officials deposit fees or costs into the local treasury. The treasurer is required to forward some fees and costs to the Comptroller, who deposits them into the judicial fund, and some fees and costs are earmarked for basic civil legal services to indigents.
Judicial System Expenditures. The total cost of the judicial system in Texas is substantially greater than the amount paid by the State.
The municipal courts, on the other hand, are profit centers for cities. The federal system has a general jurisdiction trial court, intermediate appellate courts, and a single high court; but it also has specialized trial and appellate courts to handle specific kinds of cases. California has a simple three-tier system and Florida has a simple four-tier system, both of which could be models for Texas.
In terms of court administration, the federal system provides the best model. The United States Supreme Court has administrative control over the federal courts, but the real administrative control is exercised by councils of judges from the intermediate appellate courts and trial courts who ensure the efficient administration of justice within each intermediate appellate court district.
In regard to judicial funding, there are two basic models among the states. One relies predominantly on state revenue while the other relies predominantly on local revenue. Over the years, the trend has been away from local funding and to state funding. Today, sixty percent of states now rely predominantly on state revenue to support their judicial systems.
Finally, a number of states have recognized the need for special procedures or courts to handle complicated cases. Some have special courts for business litigation, others for commercial litigation, and others for complex litigation.
Some operate within a county or region only, and others operate statewide. In one way or another, all provide guidance on how to handle litigation requiring more resources and expertise than the average case.
Federal Courts. Article III Courts. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The United States Courts of Appeals are the federal intermediate appellate courts. As shown on Map 4, the United States are divided into twelve regional circuits—the First through the Eleventh Circuits plus the District of Columbia Circuit—each with its own court of appeals.
There also were senior judges with staff servingon the federal appellate courts. The United States district courts serve as federal trial courts of general jurisdiction and, within certain limits set by Congress and the Constitution, hear nearly all categories of federal criminal and civil cases. The Court of International Trade is a special federal trial court having exclusive jurisdiction to decide civil actions against the United States, its officers, or its agencies arising out of any law pertaining to international trade.
Tribunals Adjunct to District Courts. The judges of each United States district court appoint United States magistrate judges in such numbers and to serve at such locations within the judicial districts as the Judicial Conference determines is appropriate.
Article I Courts. Territorial district courts operate in Guam, the U. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The United States Tax Court is a special court created by Congress to adjudicate disputes over certain tax deficiencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is an independent tribunal created by Congress in at the same time that the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted to establish a military judicial system.
Despite the breadth of its jurisdiction, the California Rules of Court are written so that the Court can focus on granting review of cases that are either necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an important question of law. The courts of appeal adjudicate cases in three-judge panels. California is divided into six districts, which are further divided into nineteen divisions. The California trial courts are known as Superior Courts. The size of the trial courts in California varies by county, and the number of judges in a particular court is determined by the California Legislature.
In some counties, there may be as few as two Superior Court judges. In contrast, Los Angeles County has numerous specialized divisions that are overseen by more than judges and various commissioners and referes.
New York. It hears criminal and civil cases, generally on appeal from the intermediate appellate courts. However, reforms in the s simplified it. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court must hear cases in which i the death penalty has been imposed, ii a state statute or constitutional provision has been invalidated, or iii bond validations or utility rates are at issue.
Intermediate appellate courts in Florida are known as the District Courts of Appeal. These courts are administered by three-judge panels in five districts throughout the state. Until the s, Florida maintained a complicated system of trial courts that relied on more different kinds of trial courts than any state except New York. Other States. Structurally, every state except Texas and Oklahoma has a single high court.
As is shown on Chart 5, most states twenty-eight have seven high-court judges, while seventeen states have five high-court judges. Thirty-five states have one tier of intermediate appellate courts. The number of intermediate appellate courts in each of the ten most populous states is shown in Table 5. Texas has the highest number of intermediate courts of appeals of any state. The structure of the judicial system in many states, like New York, is complicated, but a number of states have relatively simple structures.
Arizona has a supreme court, a one-level intermediate appellate court, one level of general-jurisdiction trial courts with some of those judges serving on tax courts , justice of the peace courts having limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, and municipal courts having limited criminal jurisdiction.
The national policymaking body of the federal courts is the Judicial Conference of the United States. Circuit judicial councils established in each circuit oversee the administration of the courts within their regions. Circuit judicial councils must meet at least twice a year and are comprised of the chief judge of the circuit court, who presides, and an equal number of circuit court judges and district court judges of the circuit, with the number to be determined by majority vote of all active judges of the circuit.
The Judicial Council of California serves as the policymaking and governing body for California state courts. The Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court serves as the chief administrative officer of the judicial system. Under the direction of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court, the Office of the State Courts Administrator OSCA oversees court programs and initiatives and administrative functions necessary to the operation of the courts.
In recognition of the separation of powers, Congress grants the federal judiciary the authority to prepare and execute its own budget. Once Congress approves a budget, the Judicial Conference develops a plan to spend the money, and the Administrative Office disburses funds directly to each court, which have substantial flexibility regarding use of those funds.
State Courts. There has been a steady trend toward state financing of trial courts that is still in progress, but the debate over the relative merits of state and local financing still rages. Typically, a large proportion of the money expended from state funds on the judiciary is used to pay salaries.
On the other hand, a number of states rely primarily on local revenue to fund their judicial system. In Idaho, for example, local revenue provides about three-fourths of the money necessary to operate the trial courts, and Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, and Washington all rely heavily on local revenue to support their trial courts.
The federal judicial system includes several special courts used to handle particular types of litigation. Additionally, the federal court system has a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation MDL Panel that consolidates factually similar cases in a single trial court for pretrial proceedings. The MDL Panel may transfer civil cases for pretrial proceedings if they involve common questions of fact and if transfer will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions.
Special courts for complex commercial or business matters are operating in thirteen states. Complex Litigation Courts. Georgia focuses more on the length of trial in determining which cases are complex.
Business Litigation Courts. In Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Rhode Island, the business courts operate only at a local county or local court level. The business courts in Maryland and North Carolina operate on a statewide basis. The courts in Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Rhode Island provide great detail as to the types of claims that are handled in the business courts. In these jurisdictions, claims commonly assigned to the business courts include claims related to Uniform Commercial Code transactions, claims arising from the sale of a business, claims involving internal affairs or governance of business entities, securities litigation, shareholder derivative actions, insurance coverage disputes, and intellectual property claims.
The Maryland and North Carolina courts do not have such specific rules regarding jurisdiction. In those states, factors to be considered in the assignment of cases include the number and diverse interests of the parties; the nature and extent of anticipated pretrial discovery motions; whether the parties agree to waive venue for the hearing of pretrial motions; the complexity of the evidentiary matters and legal issues involved; whether it will promote the efficient administration of justice, and such other matters as the Chief Justice deems appropriate.
Litigants in Massachusetts, Nevada, and Rhode Island may designate their cases for participation in the business courts, and the judge ultimately determines if assignment is appropriate. Commercial Litigation Courts. Commercial litigation courts operate in Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania.
In Illinois, the commercial litigation court operates only in Cook County. Litigants in the New York and Pennsylvania courts may designate their case for the commercial court, and the judge ultimately decides whether the case is appropriate for assignment. In addition, no single court or agency has sufficient authority to ensure the efficient administration of justice throughout the judicial system.
This section of the paper considers and recommends changes to the Texas judicial system that are necessary to create a modern, efficient system. First, should the two courts be merged into a single supreme court? Second, should the number of judges on the two courts each have nine be reduced?
Finally, should the Texas Supreme Court have discretionary jurisdiction in all appellate matters rather than its current restricted jurisdiction? Instead, the Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort for criminal cases in Texas. Given that forty-eight other states and the federal system have a single high court possessing both civil and criminal jurisdiction, it appears that the segregation of civil and criminal cases is not essential to a properly functioning judicial system.
On the other hand, the mere fact that other systems use a particular structure does not make the Texas structure wrong. Past reform efforts have sought to merge these two courts. All of those efforts have failed. Consistency in Decisions. One reason for merging the two high courts is to ensure consistency in decisions.
From time to time, the two courts differ in their resolution of a particular question of law. When this happens, there is no method for resolving the conflict between the courts. First, Texas civil and criminal law does not overlap extensively, so the opportunity for conflicting decisions is present, but not frequent or constant.
Lack of Voter Knowledge. Instead, voters tend to decide between judicial candidates on factors that may not indicate judicial quality. Common sense suggests that having a higher number of judicial races on the ballot is more likely to cause voter confusion and discourage voters from spending the time necessary to become knowledgeable about the candidates. With nine judges on each of the two high courts, and at least three of those judges running during each election cycle, Texas citizens vote in at least twelve state-wide judicial races considering both primary and general elections each cycle.
At the same time, they are asked to select intermediate appellate court justices, district court judges, county court judges, and justices of the peace. Administrative Efficiency. In most states and in the federal system, the highest court has administrative supervision and control of the judicial branch.
Both courts have some rulemaking authority. Having two courts with administrative and rulemaking power has the potential to create conflicts between the courts. In practice, there have not been many problems, largely because the administrative duties of the two courts do not much overlap and because the courts collaborate when promulgating rules. Opportunity for Review. The California Supreme Court accepted review of 6.
In sum, it appears that there is a significantly greater chance of obtain ing discretionary review from the Texas Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals than there is of obtaining review by the highest court in other states. This is especially true for criminal cases. From the point of view of persons participating in the judicial system, the increased opportunity for review is meaningful and is a significant reason to have separate high courts.
Judicial Expertise. Historically, criminal practitioners have been concerned that the Supreme Court, if given criminal jurisdiction, would not develop the expertise in criminal cases that the Court of Criminal Appeals already possesses. For their part, civil practitioners have been concerned that the number of criminal cases filed each year—many of which require mandatory review—would overwhelm the Supreme Court and negate its substantial experience in civil matters.
These concerns are valid. Acceptance by the Bar. Indeed, over the past 90 years, there have been several proposals to merge the Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals. All have met significant opposition from attorneys and judges, and all have failed. Need for Constitutional Amendments. Merger of the two courts would require amendments to Article V of the Texas Constitution. Texas has the highest number of high court judges of any state. Most states have seven high court judges including California, Florida and New York , and many have only five.
Even if Texas does not merge its two high courts, does it make sense for Texas to reduce the number of judges on each of the courts? On the other hand, there is considerable opinion that a seven-judge appellate court more efficiently handles cases and enunciates legal principles more clearly and directly than does a larger court. An immediate appeal to the intermediate appellate court is available from many interlocutory trial court orders that have a significant effect on a party to a case.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has jurisdiction to hear a further appeal of some of those interlocutory trial court orders, but not all.
But, unless dissent or conflict jurisdiction can be established, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a further appeal from any other appealable interlocutory trial court order.
There is no clear rationale for giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear an appeal from some appealable interlocutory trial court orders, but impeding its jurisdiction to hear appeals from other orders. The Texas Supreme Court should be given discretionary jurisdiction of all appealable interlocutory trial court orders. The Court then will have the ability to hear those cases deserving review, and to decline to hear those that do not, without regard to the matters in issue.
The Texas Supreme Court should also be given the power to prescribe rules that would provide for interlocutory appeals from trial court rulings in situations not otherwise provided by statute. Such power is statutorily vested in the U. Supreme Court under the federal system, but no similar statute exists under the Texas system. Providing the Texas Supreme Court such power would facilitate the ability of the Court and intermediate appellate courts to timely review significant trial court decisions and oversee the proper administration of civil justice in the state.
Expanding the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court does not require constitutional amendment. The Legislature should address three issues related to courts of appeals. Should the number of courts of appeals be reduced? Should overlapping appellate court districts be eliminated? Should docket equalization transfers be eliminated?
Texas has fourteen intermediate appellate courts—one more than the entire federal system, eight more than California and New York, and nine more than Florida. In fact, Texas has the largest number of intermediate appellate courts in the nation. First, the rationale for fourteen geographically dispersed courts no longer exists. From through , each court of appeals was limited by the constitution to three justices. Consequently, as population and caseloads increased, it was necessary to create new courts to handle the caseload because justices could not be added to existing courts.
Second, using fewer courts of appeals with more justices on each court would eliminate the need for docket-equalization transfers because the three-judge courts could be merged into the busier courts, thereby reallocating judgeships to fit caseloads. At present, the constitution requires at least three justices on each court of appeals.
The Legislature has opted to require the redistribution of cases from the busy courts to the less-busy courts rather than let judges sit idle or make them serve away from home, but this practice is unpopular and inefficient and should be ended.
Third, having fewer intermediate appellate courts would reduce the number of conflicting decisions. The convenience of having facilities and personnel in geographically dispersed areas, however, should not be entirely discounted. Convenience is particularly important in criminal cases in which attorneys often are court appointed and receive relatively little compensation for their work. In these cases, an attorney may not be compensated for travel time to and from the appellate court. If the attorney is compensated, the compensation is paid by a governmental entity that, in many instances, has limited resources for indigent defense.
This problem could be ameliorated if the existing appellate court facilities and some personnel remained in place so that some cases could be heard in those locations. There is precedent for basing an appellate court in one city but allowing it to hear argument in another. California has seven intermediate appellate court districts, but those seven districts are divided into twenty geographically dispersed divisions where the courts sit to hear argument.
These judges work and have professional staff in the federal courthouse in the city in which the judge resides. It is not likely, however, that reducing the number of intermediate courts of appeals would allow a reduction in the number of intermediate appellate court judges. As noted previously, comparing Texas to other large states indicates that Texas probably has the appropriate number of intermediate appellate court judges.
The two courts of appeals sitting in Houston have coextensive jurisdiction in districts that cover the same geographic area. In other words, the two courts almost function as a single entity, but exist as separate entities. We have been unable to find any other state in the union which has crafted geographically overlapping appellate districts. Both the bench and bar in counties served by multiple courts are subjected to uncertainty from conflicting legal authority. Overlapping districts also create the potential for unfair forum shopping, allow voters of some counties to select a disproportionate number of justices, and create occasional jurisdictional conflicts like this one.
As current Texas Supreme Court Justice Scott Brister noted when he was Chief Justice of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, overlapping districts can create problems, even when the districts overlap entirely, as with the two Houston courts.
No reason supports overlapping appellate court districts. The remaining instances of overlapping jurisdiction could be easily eliminated. Merging the two Houston courts into a single court would create a court with eighteen judges.
Prohibit Docket-Equalization Transfers? In one instance, for example, three appeals filed in one case were heard by three different courts of appeals. Transferring cases cures the docket disparity but creates other problems. First, it nullifies the reason for having a large number of widely dispersed courts—the savings in time, money, and convenience incurred by deciding appeals locally. Lawyers and clients who try a case in Houston may wonder about the efficiency of a system that transfers their appeal but not others to Amarillo.
Moreover, the impact on many dockets is substantial. In the last three years, transfers made up at least a quarter of appellate filings in several courts of appeals; in Eastland, transfers outnumbered all local appeals. This raises questions of burden and accountability.
While the state funds most appellate operations, part of the cost is borne locally. Why should the citizens of one region bear the cost of deciding excess appeals from another? And what can citizens do in cases with political or economic consequences if the justices who decide an appeal are beyond their vote? To the extent Texans think electing judges ensures accountability, they are not getting what they think.
Finally, transfers worsen the problem of conflicts between the various appellate courts. Without transfers, a company with statewide operations may face uncertainty, but once a case is filed it should know what the law is. Not so with transfers. Transferee appellate courts apply their own view of the law, not that of the region where the case was tried. No one knows where any appeal will go until after the trial court phase is over. Thus, a summary judgment granted or a case tried under one assumption about the law may be decided on appeal under another.
In many Texas trial courts, this is a substantial problem. Fully one third of the cases tried in Beaumont in recent years have been assigned elsewhere on appeal. Similarly, lawyers trying cases in Dallas and Houston run a ten to 20 percent chance that their appeals will land somewhere else.
When the courts of appeal disagree about the pertinent law, it is impossible to make rational trial decisions without knowing which will be applied on appeal. Docket-equalization transfers are disliked for other reasons as well. Some commentators argue that different local rules or the unfamiliarity of arguing in a transferee court may affect litigants, and some attorneys believe that a transferee court is more apt to reverse a transferred case than a case arising in its own district.
The Legislature should stop requiring docket-equalization transfers and, instead, should prohibit them. The better practice would be for the Supreme Court to use its administrative power to assign judges from the less-busy courts of appeals to the busier courts of appeals when necessary to address caseload disparity among the courts of appeals.
In , when the current constitution was adopted, Texas had a rational three-tier trial court structure having no overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases, and very little overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction in civil cases. Should the Legislature structurally unify the trial courts by creating a single-trial-court system that handles variations in litigation by assigning tasks to specific trial courts?
In , the National Center for State Courts published a paper on the funding of state courts. The paper provides such a cogent discussion about unification of trial courts that can be summarized as follows:. Better Use of Judges. It is rare that both courts in a two-tier system are operating at the same level. Generally, one is far busier than the other. The immediate effect of unification is to create a single pool of judges who can be assigned to areas of need without reference to jurisdictional boundaries.
The pooling of judges usually reduces backlog, if one exists, and also reduces the need for additional judges.
Tighter Management Structure. There is rarely any justification for two adjacent courts having separate management structures: two presiding judges, two court administrators, and two sets of supervisors. Unification produces a single administrative structure, which not only reduces costs of operation but also can provide a more effective decision-making process.
Unification also tends to reduce the number of supervisors in proportion to the number of employees, reducing middle management costs. Case Management. Having two courts with different subject matter jurisdiction creates an arbitrary division of workload, which often bears no relation to the resources of the two courts and which creates problems of redundancy, transfer, jurisdictional squabbling, and delay.
Accordingly, the Judicial Group requested that codes of judicial conduct which had been adopted in some jurisdictions be analyzed, and a report be prepared concerning: a the core considerations which recur in such codes; and b the optional or additional considerations which occur in some, but not all, such codes and which may or may not be suitable for adoption in particular countries.
In preparing a draft code of judicial conduct in accordance with the directions set out above, reference was made to several existing codes and international instruments including, in particular, the following:. At its second meeting held in Bangalore in February , the Judicial Group, proceeding by way of examination of the draft placed before it, identified the core values, formulated the relevant principles, and agreed on the code set out in this document: the Bangalore Draft.
The Judicial Group recognized, however, that since the draft Code had been developed by judges drawn principally from common law countries, it was essential that it be scrutinized by judges of other legal traditions to enable it to assume the status of a duly authenticated draft international code of judicial conduct. In deciding to publish the Bangalore Draft, the Judicial Group agreed that the judicial duty is to conform to any code of conduct which, by law or practice, is already in force in a judge's jurisdiction.
The development and existence of an international code does not relieve a judge of his or her duty under municipal law to comply with a code of conduct currently in operation in that judge's jurisdiction. The Bangalore Draft is designed:. WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognize as fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge.
WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions. WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice.
WHEREAS an independent judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to fulfil their roles as guardians of the rule of law and thereby to assure good governance.
WHEREAS consistently with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system. The following principles and rules are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges.
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